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ABSTRACT:  All sovereign governments face a commitment problem:  how can they prom-
ise to honor their own agreements?  The standard solutions involve reputation or political 
institutions capable of tying the hands of the government.  Mexico’s government in the 
1880s used neither solution.  It compensated its creditors by enabling them to extract rents 
from the rest of the economy.  These rents came through special privileges over banking 
services and the right to administer federal taxes.  Returns were extremely high:  as long as 
creditors believed that the government would refrain from confiscating all their assets (let 
alone repaying their debts) less than twice a decade, they would break even.   2 
   
There exists a commonly-accepted view about why governments charter banks to serve as 
their exclusive financial agent.  In that view, a government chooses to grant a single institu-
tion a monopoly over its borrowing because a monopolist can credibly punish defaults by 
denying future credit, whereas multiple creditors would be unable to sustain a boycott.  The 
result is more credit for the government, and more security for its creditors.  The Bank of 
England was born in such an arrangement.
1   
We do not know much, however, about cases where the government makes such a deal 
and then reneges.  Should its demand for credit rise, its time horizon fall, or new sources of 
credit become available, the government has incentives to borrow from third parties, or even 
default on its debts.
2  If the government then defaults on its debts, how can it receive credit 
in the future?  It would have to provide very high returns to creditors.  The government 
cannot simply pay higher rates, however, because creditors know that the higher the cost of 
borrowing, the more incentive a debtor has to default in the future.   
Rather than pay higher interest rates, however, the government can create arrangements 
that allow its creditors to compensate themselves for the risk of lending to the government 
by extracting rents from the rest of society.  How might such an arrangement work?  Mexico 
provides an example.  Mexico’s weak central government was incapable of raising the tax 
revenues it needed.  It could not resort to international borrowing:  Mexico’s previous inter-
national bond issues were in default.  In order to solve this problem, in 1880 the government 
chartered a bank that would finance to the government.  Yet despite issuing illegal debts and 
                                                 
1 The logic behind this is discussed in Bulow and Rogoff, “A Constant Recontracting Model”; and Weingast,   
“The Political Foundations.” 
2 New sources of credit, for example, or threats which shorten the sovereign’s time horizon, such as war or 
political instability, have prompted sovereign defaults.  See North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commit-
ment,” p. 807.  Political instability also shortens the time horizons of despotic governments, making them less 
likely to respect their own agreements.  For examples, see Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Develop-
ment”; and DeLong and Shleifer,  “Princes and Merchants.” 3 
   
then defaulting in 1884-85, the government succeeded in getting the very same bank to lend it 
new money in 1886 and underwrite its return to international credit markets in 1888.   
Mexico persuaded its creditors to continue to provide it loans by enabling them to ex-
tract rents from the rest of the Mexican economy. These rents came in three forms.  First, 
Mexico’s creditors, organized into the Banco Nacional de México (Banamex), were granted 
special privileges in the banking market.  Second, they were given the keys to the mint—
literally.  The country’s mints were turned over to the bank.  Third, Banamex was given the 
right to administer and collect certain taxes, including customs and excise taxes.  Banamex’s 
branch network gave it an advantage over the government in collecting taxes.
3  In other 
words, the Mexican government compensated its creditors for the risk of lending to it by 
enabling them to extract rents from the rest of the economy. The returns from these rents 
were so high that the government’s creditors would earn a positive return as long as the gov-
ernment refrained from confiscating all their liquid assets more than twice a decade.   
Protecting Banamex’s privileges in the banking market was easy even for Mexico’s rela-
tively disorganized government.  All Porfirio Díaz had to do was fail to enforce the property 
rights and contracts of any potential competitors.  Díaz’s government, as a practical matter, 
lacked the capability to provide property rights as a public good.  It could, however, selec-
tively and differentially enforce the property rights of particular private parties.  All other 
things being equal, the more clearly-defined and better-enforced the rights to use or transfer 
an asset, the greater the value of that asset.  Banamex, by enjoying better (if still not particu-
                                                 
3 In fact, Mexico had no centralized system of tax collection until 1906.  See Carmagnani, “El liberalismo,” p. 
488.   4 
   
larly good by the standards of, say, contemporary England) defined and enforced property 
rights than its competitors, could enjoy a very large competitive advantage over them.
4 
What kept the government from diluting Banamex’s privileges in the private credit mar-
ket or its monopoly over tax collection?  Why not allow competitors more leeway in the 
banking market, or give other creditors the right to collect taxes and run some of the mints?  
The answer is threefold.  First, it is not clear that the penurious and disorganized Porfirian 
government of the 1880s could have effectively enforced the property rights of new en-
trants.  The result might have been a reduction in the rents Banamex earned and shared with 
the government, with no commensurate gains among the entrants.  In fact, even had the 
government been able to extend Banamex’s privileges to new entrants in the 1880s, doing so 
would have destroyed the monopoly rents extracted from consumers in the banking market, 
and reduced the total surplus available to be shared with the government.  Second, an out-
right takeover of the banking sector was largely impossible, since it would have required 
capital and access to outside credit—that is, precisely what the government lacked, but the 
foreign financiers behind Banamex enjoyed.  Third, the government had little incentive to 
dilute Banamex’s monopolies over various taxes and the mint, since allowing competitors to 
challenge the monopoly would have reduced the available revenue by reducing Banamex’s 
incentives to improve the efficiency of tax collection and the mint.
5  
                                                 
4 See Haber, Razo, and Maurer, The Politics of Property Rights, for more on the issue of selectively-enforced prop-
erty rights, particularly Chapter 2. 
 
5 In some respects, the relationship between Banamex and the Mexican government is similar to the arrange-
ment that existed between the tax farming cartel of the Ferme Générale and the Crown in the eighteenth-century 
France.  Johnson, “Banking on the King,” provides a model of tax farming in the presence of transaction costs 
of collection.   Johnson’s model suggests that the explanation behind the French transition, at the end of the 
17th century, from competitive auctioning of tax farms to a monopoly cartel is the need to invest in specific tax-
collection infrastructure and technology.  The multiple monopolies enjoyed by the tax farmer were essential to 
its relative immunity from government predation. Like Banamex, the Ferme Générale amounted to a tax farming 
monopoly which doubled as a creditor for the government.  The Ferme Générale extracted revenue from the 
population and forwarded it to the government.  The exposure to predation by the government was limited, 
since, in the absence of other organizations in the ready with the infrastructure, expertise and financial re-5 
   
In the long term, the result was an uncompetitive financial system and slower economic 
growth.
6  In the short term, however, the result was financial stability, and a government ca-
pable of financing both an army capable of enforcing internal peace and a railroad system 
essential to generating economic growth.
7   
This paper is constructed as follows.  The first section details the history of Mexican 
debt defaults from independence until the 1880s.   The second briefly discusses the nature of 
the  commitment problem.  The third section discusses the government’s credit crunch and 
default in 1883-85, and discusses the nature of the agreement with Banamex.  The final sec-
tion quantifies Banamex’s supernormal profits between 1884 and 1890. 
 
MEXICO’S FISCAL PROBLEMS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Mexico’s debt problems started at independence in 1821, when the Mexican Empire rec-
ognized 30 million dollars worth of colonial debts owed to domestic merchants.  The debts 
were never repaid.
8  The first Empire collapsed in 1823.  In the following two years, the Re-
public contracted 32 million dollars of debt in London.  By 1827, it had suspended pay-
ments.  Debts contracted in the 1830s and ‘40s also went into default.  In 1851 the govern-
ment refinanced the suspended loans of 1824-25.  In 1857, however, Mexico defaulted yet 
again. 
                                                                                                                                                 
sources, the Ferme Générale could not be costlessly replaced.  Allowing competition to the Ferme Générale would 
reduce the Ferme Générale’s monopoly rents, but it would reduce the overall stream of rents shared between the 
farmer and the treasury by even more. For more details on tax farming in France, see White, “France’s Slow 
Transition.” 
 
6 For more on the negative long term consequences of Mexico’s uncompetitive financial system on the coun-
try’s economic growth, see Haber, “Industrial Concentration”; Maurer, “The Internal Consequences”; Maurer 
and Haber, “Institutional Change and Economic Growth”; and Maurer and Sharma, “Enforcing Property 
Rights.” 
7 For evidence on the importance of railroads in Mexico’s economic development, see Coatsworth, Growth 
Against Development. 
8 For the story of the colonial debt, see Marichal, La bancarrota del virreinato. 6 
   
The French government used Mexico’s debt arrears as a pretext to invade in 1862 and 
install Archduke Maximilian in Mexico City.  Facing opposition from Benito Juárez’s U.S.-
backed guerrilla forces, the French pulled out in 1866, and Maximilian fell within a year.  
Unsurprisingly, the Restored Republic under Benito Juárez refused to recognize the debts 
contracted under Maximilian.  In addition, since the British government had supported 
Maximilian, the Restored Republic suspended payments on all existing British debts.  By the 
1870s, unmet interest obligations on the British debt alone had ballooned to US$120 mil-
lion.
9 
(TABLE 1 AROUND HERE) 
Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada succeeded Benito Juárez upon Juárez’s death in 1872.  Por-
firio Díaz overthrew Lerdo in 1876.  Díaz ceded the Presidential sash to Manuel González in 
1880.  (He would take it back in 1884.)  While all three governments neglected the foreign 
debt, they all tried to amortize some of the domestic debt.  Juárez bought back a small 
amount of debt in 1868, for 31 percent of its face value.  An 1870 report to Congress indi-
cated that the 1850 convention bonds traded at 8 to 9 percent of their face value, while more 
recent debts could be purchased for 15 percent.
10  In 1876, Porfirio Díaz’s new government 
purchased debt with a face value of Mx$2.1 million at 25 percent of par.  In 1876, financiers 
held debt with a face value of 45 million pesos:  the market value of this debt was closer to 
11 million pesos.
11   
Unfortunately, the government’s need for credit had grown.  Díaz needed to equip an 
army capable of facing down threats from regional challengers.  He also to pay the army 
                                                 
9 The government tried to maintain interest payments on the loans Americans had advanced to the rebel 
movement, but these debts amounted to only US$5 million.  Marichal, “Financial Market Reform,” pp. 95-96.   
10  Carmagnani, Estado y mercado, p. 231. 
11  SHCP, Memoria, pp. 113-18.   7 
   
enought to keep the its loyalty.  His government, however, lacked the resources to effectively 
tax Mexico’s impoverished economy.  In 1877, Mexico’s per capita GNP (in 2001 dollars) 
was only $456.
12  Foreign trade was a potential source of revenue, but the country’s small 
economy generated little foreign trade. 
Mexico’s leaders believed that railroads would open Mexico’s economy to foreign in-
vestment, increase trade and tariff revenues, and allow Mexico to repay its obligations.  Mex-
ico had no decent navigable waterways, and half of all roads were unsuitable even for beasts 
of burden.  Mexico’s first railroad did not open until 1873, and by 1877 the country enjoyed 
only 400 miles of track.
13  Constructing railroads, however, required federal subsidies.   Rail-
roads were capital intensive, required long time-horizons, and demanded detailed knowledge 
of the terrain, economic conditions, and prospects for future growth.  They also required 
specialized engineering and management skills.  In an unstable polity, few private investors 
were prepared to risk substantial amounts without federal subsidies.
14  The federal govern-
ment, therefore, found itself trapped in a fiscal Catch-22.  Without railroads, there was little 
economic activity to tax; without subsidies, there were no railroads.  This was recognized by 
Mexico’s foreign creditors in 1878, when they agreed link the renewal of debt service to fu-
ture railroad growth.  In the words of the Finance Secretary, Matías Romero:   
It does not appear too hazardous to assert that, if railroads were con-
structed in the center of the country, and between the principal 
towns … in order to have access to both oceans, the nation would 
receive an impulse such that its wealth would be sensibly augmented, 
and with it the income of the Federal Treasury, which would admit of 
the punctual payment of the interest on the national debt.  The credi-
                                                 
12 See Coatswroth, “Obstacles to Economic Growth.”  The figure in 1950 dollars as computed by Coatsworth 
was $62.  Coatsworth’s 1950 estimates have been recalibrated by changing the base year of the index to 2001. 
13  Coatsworth, Growth Against Development, p.  35. 
14  See Maurer, “Banks and Entrepreneurs.”  8 
   




Mexico’s existing sources of credit were not sufficient.  A money market of sorts existed 
in Mexico City.  The federal government issued customs certificates.  These certificates enti-
tled the bearer to physically go to a specific customhouse and collect a stated amount.  Gross 
issues of customs certificates rose precipitously between 1876 and 1882.  (See Table 2.)   
Most funds, however, were paid back in six months, and net long-term borrowing was zero 
until 1882.   Before then, railroad subsidies came out of the military budget, a dangerous pol-
icy in a country prone to regional revolts and military coups.   If the government were to 
build railroads quickly, it needed to borrow more than this thin market could finance.  (See 
Table 3.)     
(TABLES 2 AND 3 AROUND HERE) 
There is no evidence that the Mexican government considered printing money to cover 
its deficit.  There is a reason for that:  inflationary finance had not been particularly success-
ful elsewhere in Latin America.  Argentina provides an example.  On multiple occasions, Ar-
gentine governments filled fiscal shortfalls by printing money. None of these episodes raised 
revenues for more than a few years, and all were followed by painful efforts to re-establish 
convertibility.  The mechanism behind inflationary finance in Argentina was not the issuance 
of government fiat money.  Argentine governments (like Mexican ones) lacked the credibility 
to force people to accept its notes.  Rather, the mechanism was to establish private banks 
that would issue notes redeemable in gold, and then suspend the convertibility of those 
notes.
16 It was, in short, not unlike issuing interest-free bonds with a promise to repay in the 
                                                 
15  Romero, Report of the Secretary, p. 40. 
16  For more on Argentine inflationary finance in the nineteenth century, see Bordo, “What If Alexander Ham-
ilton Had Been Argentinean?” 9 
   
future.  Even had the Mexican government wanted to follow the Argentine example, it could 
not have persuaded the public to accept its note issues because it had already defaulted on its 
debts and its bonds traded for as little as 8 centavos on the peso. 
The government, therefore, decided to create a bank.  Emilio Velasco, a lawyer from 
northern Mexico acting in the employ of the federal  government, used his contacts with 
Gustavo G. Godowa, the Polish publisher of the Mexican publication Le Nouveau Monde, to 
open negotiations with the Banque Franco-Egyptienne over the establishment of a bank that 
would serve as the primary financial agent for the federal government.
17  After a year, an 
agreement was signed on August 11th, 1881, between Edouard Noetzlin, the Banque 
Franco-Egyptienne’s representative, and the Finance Ministry.  The agreement established 
the bank as the federal government’s financial agent, and stipulated that its banknotes would 
be the only ones recognized for federal taxes.
18  Most of the new bank’s capital came from 
overseas.
19    Credit from the Banco Nacional Mexicano allowed the government to run a 
small budget deficit in the 1881-82 fiscal year.    
The Banco Nacional Mexicano was not the only bank in Mexico.  Four other formal in-
stitutions existed in 1881.  One was a small bank founded by Americans in the frontier state 
of Chihuahua.  The second was the Banco de Londres, México, y Sud-América, a British 
bank that had operated in Mexico since 1864.
20  The third was the Nacional Monte de 
Piedad.  The Monte de Piedad began operations during the colonial era, advancing small 
amounts against goods presented to it as guarantees. 
21  On September 6th, 1879, Governor 
                                                 
17  Ludlow, “La construcción de un banco,” p. 303.   
18  Ludlow, “El Banco Nacional Mexicano,” p. 985; and Martínez Sobral, Estudios elementales, p.  27. 
19  Ludlow, “La construcción de un banco,” p.  321. 
20  Labastida, Estudio histórico, p.  64. 
21  Labastida, Estudio histórico, p.  73. 10 
   
José Ceballos of the Distrito Federal proposed that the Montepío be permitted to discount 
commercial paper and issue “deposit certificates” that could be turned in for specie.  Presi-
dent Díaz agreed, and the Monte de Piedad became a bank on October 1
st, 1879.
22     
The fourth bank was founded as a response to the Banco Nacional Mexicano.  A group 
of enterprising merchants decided to found their own bank, claiming that it was their “patri-
otic duty” to invest in a “free” bank in order to stop Mexican capital from leaving “to in-
crease other nations’ prosperity.”
23  Ironically, most of the merchants who subscribed to the 
Banco Mercantil’s stock had been born in Spain.
24  The Banco Mercantil claimed that com-
petition between different banks for federal business would benefit everybody.
25 
 
THE COMMITMENT PROBLEM 
Why would the simple act of chartering a bank aid the government in solving its credit 
problem?  After all, the French and Mexican owners of the new bank faced the same uncer-
tainty as other creditors.  The government could as easily suspend payments on bank debt as 
on bond issues.  Of course, foreign powers could use military force to collect their debts.  In 
fact, President Benito Juárez’s refusal to honor the debts of the previous Conservative gov-
ernment prompted a French invasion in 1862.  That adventure, however, turned into a fi-
asco.  The only power that might be capable of forcing Mexico to repay its debts in the 
1880s was the United States, but there is no evidence that the American government had any 
interest in doing so.   
                                                 
22  Labastida, Estudio histórico, p.  74.   
23  Archivo Histórico del Banco Nacional de México [hereafter AHBNM], 29 August 1881, Actas de la fundación 
del Banco Mercantil Mexicano. 
24  AHBNM, 17 September 1884, Actas de consejo, vol. 1.   
25  AHBNM, 18 March 1882, Actas de la fundación del Banco Mercantil Mexicano. 11 
   
The only recourse creditors had to induce repayment was the threat of denying future 
credit.  Therefore, the largest penalty which they could impose upon the Mexican govern-
ment was the present value of any future borrowing.
 26  It is difficult, however, for multiple 
lenders to effectively enforce a credit boycott.  Boycotts hurt lenders almost as much as they 
hurt borrowers.  The government will be denied credit, but its creditors will be denied the 
opportunity to make profitable loans.
27  With a multiplicity of lenders, the government can 
default on some while continuing to borrow from others.  In fact, the government has no 
incentive not to default on any single lender.  After all, the marginal value of the last loan the 
government takes at the prevailing interest rate was presumably zero, and therefore so is the 
cost of default and alienating that particular creditor.
28   
Of course, lenders are presumably alert to this sort of thing.  Therefore, one would ex-
pect lenders to organize a boycott if the government began defaulting on only some of it 
debts.  Unfortunately, collective boycotts are not credible without an enforcement mecha-
nism.  This is because the government can offer extraordinarily good terms to violators.  The 
more restrictive the boycott, the greater the government’s need for credit, and the more 
credible its offers of good terms for violators.  The value of the punishment lenders can levy 
on the government will be low, and so will be its credit limit.   
Therefore, by concentrating its borrowing in a single institution, the government can 
raise the amount of pain caused by a default, since a single lender can credibly impose a 
credit boycott.  The result, in theory, is an increase in the government’s ability to borrow.  
The rub is that the government has no binding ex post reason to limit its borrowing.  If the 
government’s demand for credit increases, then it will happily pledge to give one creditor a 
                                                 
26  See Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz, “The Pure Theory of Country Risk.” 
27 See Bulow and Rogoff, “A Constant Recontracting Model.”   
28 Weingast, “The Political Foundations,” p.  215. 12 
   
monopoly over lending while surreptitiously seeking out additional creditors.  That is pre-
cisely what happened after 1884.
29   
 
MEXICAN DEFAULT IN THE 1880S 
In 1883 and 1884, the Mexican government reneged on its agreement with the Banco 
Nacional Mexicano.  In order to circumvent its 4 million peso debt ceiling with the bank, 
Manuel González’s government surreptitiously borrowed from a widely dispersed group of 
creditors, ran up a huge debt, and finally suspended payments.  This behavior should not be 
surprising.  Many of the trunk lines had already been constructed by 1884, and as the year 
drew on it became increasingly obvious that President González lacked the political support 
to keep himself in power.  Why not borrow as much as you can, while you still can?  What is 
surprising about this episode is not that the Mexican government defaulted, but that it man-
aged to regain access to credit within two years.  By 1888, in fact, the Banco Nacional’s suc-
cessor bank would underwrite Mexico’s return to the international credit markets.   
What prompted the default?  In 1882-83, federal spending began to outpace revenues.  
(See Table 3.)   The government began issuing customs certificates faster than it redeemed 
them.  It also requested advances from Mexico’s other banks, in contravention of its agree-
ment with the Banco Nacional.  Changes in tariff schedules kept the deficit from growing in 
1883-84, but the respite was temporary.  In May 1883 the Banco Nacional Mexicano lent the 
federal government 150,000 pesos, followed in November by an additional loan of 
                                                 
29  Mexico in the 1880s is not the only example of this.  Phillip Hoffman found that the 17th century French 
monarchs often played various lenders off against each other, defaulting on one while borrowing from another.  
When lenders developed new ways to coordinate their punishments under Louis XIV, the amount the French 
government could borrow increased.  Similarly, the recent Latin American debt crises follow the pattern, where 
the largest problem the banks faced was coordinating their actions in the event of a default.  These and other 
examples can be found in Weingast, “The Political Foundations,” pp.  229-230.   13 
   
Mx$700,000 in exchange for Mx$1,000,000 in customs certificates due six months later.
30  
The effective annualized interest rate was 104 percent.
31  By mid-1884 the government had 
mortgaged 60% of the port of Campeche’s customs revenues, 84% of Veracruz’s, and 90% 
of Matamoros’s and Tampico’s.
32   Despite the fiscal constraints, the government continued 
to promise future railway subsidies.  This hidden debt grew even faster than open borrow-
ing.
33   
Federal deficits caused foreign railway investors to doubt that the government could 
cover its subsidy promises.  Therefore, they ceased investing.  Imports of manufactured iron 
and steel, used primarily in railroad building, provide a rough proxy for investment.  After 
rising from US$1.3 million in 1880 to US$4.2m in 1882, they fell to US$3.8m in 1883, slid to 
US$2.4m in 1884, plunged to US$1.2m in 1885, and bottomed out at US$904,554 in 1886.
34   
The fall in foreign investment occurred at a bad time, because Mexico suffered a crop 
failure in 1884.  With the government gobbling up domestic credit, foreign capital drying up, 
and specie flowing out to pay for imports of basic foodstuffs, rural bankruptcies multiplied.  
This slowed business activity, which caused imports to drop, which lowered the govern-
ment’s tariff revenue.  That, in turn, increased the fiscal deficit, thereby worsening the credit 
crunch and exacerbating the crisis.  Banks ceased lending.
35   In fact, the crisis brought down 
                                                 
30  Marichal, “Foreign Loans,” p.  348.  The Mexican merchant houses involved in the deal included Bermejillo 
Hermanos, Benecke Sucursales, Félix Cuevas, Gutheil y Compañía, Ramón G. Guzmán, Lavie y Compañía, 
and Antonio de Mier y Celis.  AHBNM, Contract #1, Syndicate “Ordenes del Pacífico,” Libro de Contratos Origi-
nales de Empréstitos. 
31  The implicit interest rate on this loan was calculated as (1,000,000/700,000)2 - 1.   
32  SHCP, Memoria, pp. 70-79. 
33   Marichal, “Foreign Loans,” p.  348.     
34  Since they were not taxed, the decline in these imports did not directly affect the government’s fiscal situa-
tion.   
35  AHBNM, 28 March 1883 and 4 April 1883, Libro de Actas del Banco Nacional Mexicano.   14 
   
one of Mexico’s bank, the Nacional Monte de Piedad.
36   In January 1884, the government 
requested five million pesos from the Banco Nacional Mexicano.  The bank could not meet 
this demand.
37   
The solution was to engineer the merger of the Banco Nacional and the Banco Mercantil 
into a new bank called the Banco Nacional de México (henceforth Banamex).  Edouard No-
etzlin, the chief representative of the bank’s French owners, arrived in Mexico in February 
1884 to begin the negotiations over the merger.  President González placed Porfirio Díaz in 
charge of the government’s team.
38  The new bank was largely owned by Mexican residents.
39   
The agreement gave Banamex a monopoly over all lending to the federal government.
40  
The bank was also exempted from all federal taxes, except the stamp tax, while the govern-
ment promised to subject the other banks to a 5% tax on banknote issues.  Banamex re-
ceived the right to issue banknotes up to three times the amount of its reserves, which could 
consist of federal bonds in addition to specie.  Its competitors were limited to a ratio of two 
pesos in notes for every peso of vault specie.
41  The government also agreed to turn over half 
of the revenue of the Progreso, San Blas, and Mazatlán customhouses directly to the bank.
 42   
In return, Banamex opened a four million peso credit line to the government, and soon 
offered more.  By the middle of 1884 the government owed Banamex Mx$5,686,559.
43  By 
                                                 
36  Labastida Estudio histórico, p.  76. 
37  AHBNM, January 24 1884, Libro de Actas del Banco Nacional Mexicano.   
38 Marichal, “Financial Market Reform,” p. 101.   
39 See Ludlow, “La construcción de un banco.” 
40  This was not appreciably different from the privileges the Banco Nacional Mexicano had obstensibly en-
joyed.  Ludlow, “La construcción de un banco,” p. 332. 
41  Labastida, Estudio histórico, p.  99. 
42  AHBNM, 12 August 1884, Actas de consejo, vol. 1.   
43  AHBNM, 1 July 1884, Actas de consejo, vol. 1.   15 
   
September, the bank had lent an additional two million pesos.
 44  This debt was liquidated at 
a minuscule rate.
45  Banamex was also charged with engineering Mexico’s return to European 
capital markets.  Banamex agreed to underwrite a conversion of Mexico’s outstanding debt 
into £6,000,000 of sterling-denominated bonds at lower interest rates.   
Unfortunately, the “Noetzlin contract” ignited a political firestorm back in Mexico City 
when it was presented to Congress in October 1884.  It arrived smack-dab in the middle of 
President González’s quiet campaign to keep Porfirio Díaz from reassuming the presidency.  
Several Congressional deputies bitterly opposed the contract, objecting against the £1.3 mil-
lion—roughly 20%—commission charged by Banamex.  As Carlos Marichal has pointed 
out, these commissions were probably intended to cover the government’s outstanding 
seven million peso debt to the bank.  Nevertheless, before a final vote could be taken, hun-
dreds of students took to the streets chanting, “Die, Manuel González!  Die, Noetzlin!”  
Two people were killed and hundreds injured in the resulting riot.
 46   
Neither González nor Noetzlin died, but the contract did.  Mexico City was in the midst 
of bitter in-fighting over who should succeed Manuel González.  Porfirio Díaz presumably 
had little incentive to help his protégé-cum-opponent resolve the country’s credit problems.  
Díaz regained the presidency, and he informed Noetzlin that both the contract and commis-
sion were dead.
47  
The failure of the Noetzlin contract failed to shrink the government’s demand for credit.  
Banamex charged the government an effective interest rate of 39.4% on a 300,000 peso ad-
                                                 
44  Banamex loaned the government an additional two million pesos, at 7%, in October, premised upon the 
receipt of the Noetzlin loan.  AHBNM, 30 September 1184 and 7 October 1884, Actas de consejo, vol. 1.   
45  AHBNM, 12 August 1884, Actas de consejo, vol. 1.   
46  Marichal, “Foreign Loans,” pp.  351-52. 
47  Communication from Dublán to Noetzlin, 21 January 1885, reproduced in Castillo, Colección de leyes, pp.  54-
57. 16 
   
vance made to make loan payments due in New York in January 1885.
48  In March the gov-
ernment illegally borrowed Mx$1,094,201 from Banamex through the expedient of not pay-
ing money orders drawn on New York.
49  In April the bank’s board approved a further 
300,000 peso “emergency” loan to the government.
50   
On June 22nd, 1885, Finance Secretary Manuel Dublán announced what the contempo-
rary financial press called a “coup-d’état”:  the suspension of all interest payments on short 
term debt.
51  Deprived of credit, the government was forced to halt all subsidy payments and 
slashed the salaries of state employees 10 to 15 percent.
 52  Banamex was left high and dry, 
and faced a very serious bank run.  (See Table 4.)  Its directors “agreed” to give the govern-
ment until June 1886 to resume payments.  In point of fact, the bank had little choice.
53   
(TABLE 4 AROUND HERE) 
Within a year, however, Banamex opened new credits to the federal government.
54  In 
1888, the bank aided the government in converting its outstanding foreign and domestic 
debts into new bonds at much lower interest rate.  In 1893, it underwrote the government’s 




                                                 
48  Calculated from data in the AHBNM, 13 January 1885, Actas de consejo, vol. 2.  The price of silver fell in 
1884-85, causing the peso to depreciate strongly, falling from 89¢ (US) to 85¢.  It would continue to fall until 
1888, when it would pause at  75¢ before beginning to decline again in 1892.   
49  AHBNM, 2 March 1885 and 4 March 1885, Actas de consejo, vol. 2.   
50  AHBNM, 22 April 1885, Actas de consejo, vol. 2.   
51  Marichal, “Foreign Loans,” pp.  352-53. 
52  Marichal, “Financial Market Reform,” pp. 103-104. 
53 AHBNM, 2 June 1885 and 19 June 1885, Actas de consejo, vol. 2.   
54 AHBNM, 23 November 1886, vol. 2. 17 
   
PROFITS 
Why did the bank choose to aid the federal government?  After all, Banamex had been 
seriously burned by the government’s suspension of payments and the subsequent bank run.  
Why risk good money after bad?   
Banamex had three reasons.  First, Banamex was, in effect, empowered to collect taxes 
on the government’s behalf.   Banamex became the official financial agent of the federal 
government, which meant that all tax payments and disbursements passed through its hands.  
In addition, Banamex held all deposits made as guarantees of government contracts.  The 
bank’s directors collected a 3 percent commission on these funds.
55   In fact, Banamex was 
given the right to collect or administer some taxes directly.  In 1885, the government mort-
gaged 10 percent of all customs revenue (staring on July 1
st, 1886) to the bank.
56  In 1888, the 
administration of (and revenues from) the Veracruz customhouse and national lottery were 
given to Banamex.
57  In 1893, it was granted the right to the revenues from all federal excise 
taxes on alcohol in return for a loan of £267,500 to pay for railroad subsidies.
58  In 1893, in 
return for a loan of 2.5 million pesos, Banamex was granted administrative control over the 
federal mints.  Banamex promised to continue kicking back to the government what it had 
previously earned from the mints (4.41% for silver pesos and 4.618% for gold), but believed 
                                                 
55 AHBNM, 25 July 1888, vol. 3. 
56 AHBNM, 29 September 1885, vol. 2. 
57 AHBNM, 25 July 1888, vol. 3. 
58 AHBNM, “Contract #28,” Libro de Contratos Originales con el Gobierno Federal.  It should be noted that this ar-
rangement appears to have contravened a federal law which declared that, “The issue of [revenue] stamps shall 
be an exclusive responsibility of the federal government.  No state, authority, nor corporation may issue them, 
nor collect taxes or fees by this means.”  Carmagnani,  “El liberalismo,” p. 488. 18 
   
it could run the operation much more efficiently.
59    In other words, the government’s chief 
creditor became, in effect, a tax farmer. 
These arrangments benefitted the government as well as the bank.  The share of alcohol 
taxes in all internal taxes doubled the year Banamex took over their collection.
60  Federal 
revenues from coinage increased more than sevenfold in the years following Banamex’s 
takeover.  In short, not only did the government gain from these arrangements by gaining 
access to credit; it also improved its fiscal position directly.
61 
(TABLE 5 AROUND HERE) 
Second, the government enabled Banamex to extract rents indirectly from the rest of the 
Mexican economy.  The Banco de Londres y México was the only bank besides Banamex 
permitted to branch across state lines.  They could enjoy economies of scale and diversify 
their risks in a way that the smaller banks could not.    The federal government protected 
Banamex from new startups, authorized by state governments, by federalizing all bank char-
tering in 1884.
62   Banamex’s role as the government’s financial agent gave it a secure source 
of liquidity (and 3 percent commissions) not enjoyed by its competitors.  In addition, the 
government Banamex promised Banamex a monopoly over issuing banknotes. 
63  The Banco 
de Londres y México used its political influence to prevent Banamex from fully exercising its 
monopoly, but Banamex still enjoyed a great deal of protection from competition, because 
                                                 
59 AHBNM, 21 March 1893, Actas de consejo, vol. 3, and “Contract #27,” Libro de Contratos Originales con el Gobier-
no Federal. 
60 From Figure 4 in Carmagnani,  “El liberalismo,” p. 482. 
61 Interestingly, these tax farming-like arrangements paralleled those between the Spanish government and the 
Banco de España in Spain proper and the Banco Española de la Isla de Cuba in Spain’s colony.  See Fernández, 
Encumbered Cuba, pp. 34 and 101-02.    
62 Labastida, Estudio histórico, pp.  67-68.  The same law also authorized the federal government to tax banknote 
issues.  The government promised Banamex that it would impose a 5 percent levy on the issues of all its exist-
ing competitors, but a political outcry forced it to renege on this promise.   
63  AHBNM, 20 January 1885 and 27 Januaary 1885, Actas de consejo, vol. 1. 19 
   
only its notes were acceptable for federal tax payments.  The government lacked the capacity 
to extract these rents—a monopolistic position in the capital market only generates profits if 
you have capital to invest—but it could enable Banamex’s owners to do so. 
In 1888, under pressure from the state governors, the federal government granted con-
cessions for fourteen new banks.  These concessions worried Banamex, although only half 
of the new concessions allowed their holders to issue banknotes.
64  The financial press, how-
ever, was more sanguine.  When the Banco de Sonora opened its doors in 1889, the Econo-
mista Mexicano observed that “the Banco de Sonora has not been conceded the innumerable 
franchises and exemptions that the privileged Banco Nacional de México enjoys.”
65  The 
press turned out to be correct.  None of the concessions which lacked the right to issue 
banknotes ever opened their doors. 
66  Of the additional seven concessions, three failed and 
none of the others were allowed to branch outside their home state.  Nor were they allowed 
to issue more capital without the explicit permission of the Finance Secretary (who always 
said no) and their note issues were very carefully monitored.  As a practical matter their 
banknotes failed to circulate outside their home state.
 67 
                                                 
64  AHBNM, 26 October 1889, Actas de consejo, vol. 3. 
65  Economista Mexicano, 14 September 1889.  Dublán also granted several charters for “bancos agrícolas e indus-
triales.”  In 1889 he handed out seven concessions in San Luis Potosí, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Puebla, Veracruz, 
Zacatecas, and Yucatán.  Manuel Saavedra, a political ally of Dublán’s, received the San Luis Potosí concession 
on August 6th.  The Veracruz concession went to an American, George Wilson, while the others went to 
prominent Mexican businessmen.  See Labastida, Estudio histórico, pp.  106-10.  The Puebla concession went to 
Tómas Iglesias, who succeeded in persuading the government to both allow his bank to branch nationally and 
to issue mortgage bonds in overseas markets.  See “Contrato celebrado entre el Sr. Lic. Manuel Dublán...y el Sr. 
Tómas Iglesias,” 29 August 1889, reproduced in Labastida, Estudio histórico, pp.  447-49.  In 1890 Dublán 
handed out another concession for a bank in Coahuila.  See the Economista Mexicano, 3 May 1890 and 7 June 
1890.   
66  Economista Mexicano, 14 September 1889; Labastida Estudio histórico, pp. 106-10; and the “Contrato celebrado 
entre el Sr. Lic. Manuel Dublán...y el Sr. Tómas Iglesias,” 29 August 1889, reproduced in Labastida, Estudio 
histórico, pp.  447-49. 
67 See Haber, Razo, and Maurer, The Politics of Property Rights, chapter 4. 20 
   
Third, Banamex was able to use its position as the government’s official financial agent 
to reap enormous profits from underwriting the government’s debt conversions.  In other 
words, Banamex was able to extract rents from the government’s former creditors, in return 
for the hope (which turned out to be well-founded) that the written-down debts would be 
repaid.  
The government used Banamex as an intermediary to negotiate the conversion of its 
outstanding debts.  In 1886, the government persuaded its British creditors to write off its 
outstanding interest arrears.  That same year, domestic claims with a face value of 57 million 
pesos were converted to 3% bonds worth approximately 25 million pesos.  In 1888, Ba-
namex arranged a European conversion loan.  The proceeds from the new loan were used to 
pay off the government’s existing debt to Banamex and buy up Mexico’s outstanding foreign 
obligations at 40 percent of their face value.  The country’s creditors wrote off 37 percent of 
Mexico’s foreign debts, for a net saving of £8.7 million.
 68  Banamex received a commission 
worth 0.5 percent on the entire value of the operation.
69  In addition, it received 18 percent 
of the profits from underwriting the sales of the new bonds in Europe.  This amounted to 
29 percent of Banamex’s total profits for 1888.
70  Noetzlin took an additional private 
commission worth one million pesos.  In fact, the underwriters’ profits were so high that the 
London Times criticized the transaction.  “The only explanation,” they wrote, “is that the 
Mexican government are greatly harassed by the persistent demands of the National Bank of 
Mexico to repay loans which are of long standing.”
71   
                                                 
68 Marichal, “Financial Market Reform,” pp. 105-107. 
69 Extraordinary session, 3/21/88, Actas de consejo, vol. 3, AHBNM 
70 Marichal, “Financial Market Reform,” p. 107.  The first tranche of £3.7 million was purchased by the under-
writing consortium at 70 percent of par and sold at 85, while the second tranche was purchased at 85 and sold 
at 92. 
71 Cited in Marichal, “Financial Market Reform,” pp. 108-109. 21 
   
What the Times did not understand was that the transaction was good for all the parties 
involved.  The government reduced its outstanding debt and began rebuilding its interna-
tional reputation.   Banamex divested itself of the government’s outstanding debt and earned 
high profits.  Mexico’s foreign creditors got to exchange moribund debts for lower debts 
that might be—and, ex post, were—repaid.   Later conversions in 1889 and 1890, and new 
debt issues in 1892 and 1893, followed the same pattern.  In 1892 and ‘93, for example, the 
government found it difficult to place its bonds in Europe.    Banamex underwrote the 
loans, buying the entire bond issue from the government, and waited a year to re-sell them 
on the European market.
 72 
How high were Banamex’s profits?  The answer is:  extremely high.  (See Table 6 and 
Table 7.)  The bank earned an average return on equity of 24 percent.  By 1888, the bank’s 
owners had earned back their entire eight-million peso investment.   As might be expected, 
the bank paid out the majority of its profits in dividends, and reinvested very little.   
(TABLE 6 AND 7 AROUND HERE) 
During the 1880s, Mexico was an inflationary economy as the silver peso depreciated 
against gold.    The figures in Table 7 have therefore been adjusted by the Gómez-
Musacchio price index (which begins in 1886) in order to adjust for changes in the price 




                                                 
72 These loans were to finance railroad construction across the Tehuantepec isthmus and drainage works in 
Mexico City.  Marichal, “Financial Market Reform,” p. 110. 22 
   
Mexico faced a severe dilemma in the 1880s.  The government needed to finance an 
army, build a railroad net, and bring political stability to the country.   This required a great 
deal of money.  Unfortunately, the government’s ability to extract taxes was limited.  With-
out taxes, the government could not pay tax collectors; without tax collectors, the govern-
ment could not collect taxes. 
The only way to square the circle was to borrow.  Unfortunately, in order to borrow, 
Mexico needed to solve the commitment problem.  Since the government had come to 
power in a military coup in 1876 and faced strong opposition, no one believed it would be 
long-lived.  In addition, Mexico had a long history of debt defaults.  The regime tried to cre-
ate a credible commitment by giving one credit institution a monopoly over lending to the 
government.  Unfortunately, the government could not implement this solution effectively.  
As its demand for credit grew, the government borrowed from third parties and eventually 
defaulted on its debt.   Its need for funds remained, but it remained unable to directly extract 
significant rents from the economy. 
The solution was to contract with an institution that would be capable of extracting such 
rents.    The government could not issue banknotes, because with no specie reserves and a 
debt in default it could not convince anyone to accept them.  Banamex’s wealthy owners, 
however, had specie reserves.  The government could not run the mint efficiently.  Banamex, 
however, could.  The government lacked the capital to enter the banking business.  It could, 
however, grant lucrative special privileges to someone who did.  It short, the government 
could sell a stream of rents to wealthy private parties in return for credit.  These rents com-
pensated Banamex for the risk of doing business with an unstable government. 23 
   
The arrangement was suboptimal in some abstract economic sense.
73  It was not, how-
ever, necessarily bad for Mexico.  Given Mexico’s political instability, it is not clear that al-
ternative strategies would have been feasible.  The government it could barely keep up the 
payments on its existing debt, let alone contract new debts at the usurious rates that would 
have been necessary.  Foregoing new credit would have also meant foregoing the construc-
tion of a national rail net and a strong federal army, which would have resulted in more po-
litical instability and economic stagnation.  Historical contingency made the second-best so-
lution the only feasible solution.  Given Mexico’s history, the political generation and distri-
bution of rents to a select group was better than the alternative of continued chaos.   
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Table 1:  Mexico’s outstanding foreign obligations, 1000s of pounds sterling 
1837 bonds                                            434  
1843 bonds                                            200  
1846 bonds                                              21  
1851 bonds                                        10,241  
1851 certificates                                            180  
1864 bonds                                          4,864  
Baring certificates                                              75  
English conversion debt                                          1,180  
TOTAL                                        17,195  
Source:  Carlos Marichal, "Financial Market Reform and External Debt," in Bortz and 
Haber, The Mexican Economy, 1870-1930, Stanford 2002, p. 106-7. 
 
Table 2:  Gross short-term federal borrowing 
(1000s of current pesos) 
 1872-73    $                  4,402  
 1873-74    $                  3,328  
 1874-75    $                  4,181  
 1875-76    $                  3,819  
 1876-77    $                  4,742  
 1877-78    $                  9,686  
 1878-79    $                11,464  
 1879-80    $                13,951  
 1880-81    $                  2,399  
 1881-82    $                16,423  
 1882-83    $                16,369  
 1883-84    $                30,563  
 1884-85    $                89,090  
 1885-86    $             115,057  
 1886-87    $                79,651  
 1887-88    $             129,932  
 1888-89    $                63,708  
 1889-90    $                49,444  
 1890-91    $                61,060  
 1891-92    $                34,380  
 1892-93    $                58,987  
 1893-94    $                40,823  
 1894-95    $                39,751  
Derived from the Cuadros de Información Hacendaria, 1825-1970 
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Table 3:  Mexican federal spending, 1000s of current pesos 
Year   Total spending  Railroad subsidies  Military  Net surplus 
 1876-77   $                14,592  $              -  $       9,639   $       1,334  
 1877-78   $                17,925  $             82  $       8,220   $       3,136  
 1878-79   $                16,849  $           573  $       7,281   $          479  
 1879-80   $                20,804  $       1,364  $       7,266   $          304  
 1880-81   $                23,795  $       1,001  $       6,099   $       2,295  
 1881-82   $                31,128  $       3,602  $       5,870   $        (686) 
 1882-83   $                49,287  $     12,322  $     12,752   $   (11,280) 
 1883-84   $                58,861  $     11,025  $     11,597   $   (21,576) 
 1884-85   $                54,928  $     12,957  $     10,724   $   (24,588) 
 1885-86   $                42,122  $       4,727  $     10,088   $   (13,325) 
Derived from the Cuadros de Información Hacendaria, 1825-1970. 
Table 4:  Banamex reserves, note circulation, and deposits in 1885 
  Column A  Column B  Column C   
   Specie reserves  
Banknotes in  
circulation Deposits  A/(B+C) 
Jan-85   $            5,311    $                  5,798   $                9,404  35% 
Feb-85   $            5,179    $                  6,172   $                8,977  34% 
Mar-85   $            4,969    $                  5,997   $                9,366  32% 
Apr-85   $            4,750    $                  5,744   $                9,340  31% 
May-85   $            4,553    $                  6,011   $                9,136  30% 
Jun-85   $            2,862    $                  4,713   $                9,029  21% 
Jul-85   $            3,252    $                  4,524   $                8,428  25% 
Aug-85   $            3,459    $                  4,463   $                8,197  27% 
Sep-85   $            3,966    $                  4,767   $                7,219  33% 
Oct-85   $            4,228    $                  5,235   $                7,472  33% 
Nov-85   $            5,317    $                  5,611   $                7,930  39% 
Dec-85   $            5,615    $                  6,275   $                7,661  40% 
Source:  Economista Mexicano, various. 28 
   
Table 5:  Federal revenues from the mint, current pesos 
1881-82   $                  41,719  
1882-83   $              3,583,961  
1883-84   $                248,167  
1884-85   $                222,023  
1885-86   $                  77,976  
1886-87   $                237,786  
1887-88   $                120,594  
1888-89   $                103,411  
1889-90   $                109,961  
1890-91   $                123,962  
1891-92   $                134,811  
1892-93   $                417,326  
1893-94   $                812,819  
1894-95   $                819,602  
1895-96   $              1,345,193  
1896-97   $              1,417,938  
1897-98   $              1,447,938  
1898-99   $              1,410,858  
 Annual  averages: 
1881-87   $                735,272  
1887-93   $                168,344  
1893-99   $              1,209,058  
Source:  Carmagnani, Apéndice 3. 
Table 6:  Banamex profits, current pesos 









1884*   1,241              800            8,441     16%   
1885    1,690           1,600            8,531       22,467   20%  8% 
1886        1,699            2,200            8,630        29,347   20%  6% 
1887        2,416           2,200           8,846         32,467   28%  7% 
1888        3,022            2,800            9,068          36,355   34%  8% 
1889        3,117            2,800           9,385          38,533   34%  8% 
1890        3,454            2,800          10,039          41,550   37%  8% 
1891        3,456            2,800          10,695          42,144   34%  8% 
1892        3,232            2,800          11,127          46,684   30%  7% 
1893        3,630            3,200          11,557          42,921   33%  8% 
1894        4,138            3,400          12,295          50,480   36%  10% 
1895        3,847            3,400          12,742          55,742   31%  8% 
1896        4,068            3,600          13,210          65,883   32%  7% 
1897**        3,804           3,600          14,414          71,688   29%  6% 
1898        3,907           3,600   14,721  82,727  29%  5% 
  *  The 1884 figure is only for the second half of the year. 
**   In 1897, the bank called in one-million pesos in capital from its shareholders.  The profit figures have been 
adjusted accordingly. 
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Table 7:  Banamex profits, constant pesos 










1886   $      1,699    $       2,200    $       8,630    $     29,347   16%  3% 
1887   $      1,998    $       2,117    $       8,511    $     31,237   18%  4% 
1888   $      1,979    $       2,475    $       8,015    $     32,133   18%  4% 
1889   $      2,127    $       2,330    $       7,811    $     32,071   19%  5% 
1890   $      3,576    $       2,483    $       8,904    $     36,852   31%  8% 
1891   $      3,798    $       2,635    $    10,066    $     39,666   33%  9% 
1892   $      1,648    $       2,355    $       9,359    $     39,267   14%  4% 
1893   $      2,510    $       2,574    $       9,296    $     34,523   22%  6% 
1894   $      3,135    $       2,693    $       9,738    $     39,981   27%  7% 
1895   $      3,465    $       2,781    $    10,422    $     45,594   28%  7% 
1896   $      3,298    $       2,938    $    10,782    $     53,773   18%  7% 
1897   $      3,085    $       2,934    $    10,933    $     58,426   25%  6% 
1898   $      4,424    $       3,018    $    12,339    $     69,343   36%  8% 
All figures in 1886 pesos, adjusted by the Gómez-Musachio AB price index. 
 